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Abstract 
Robert Musil’s 1937 address «Über die Dummheit» navigated a challenging subject in a 
treacherous climate for free speech and simultaneously affirmed Musil’s conception of 
the necessary symbiosis of aesthetics and ethics. This paper argues for a reading of the 
address and its preparatory notes wherein Musil’s gendered «Stupidity» (Die Dummheit) 
represents the ethical role of the artist, as poetic, non-conscripted voice – and, thus, of 
Musil himself – in a period of totalitarian brutality and linear «final solutions». 
In 1931 Robert Musil was nominated by Thomas Mann to take the va-
cant seat left by Arthur Schnitzler on the Writers’ Section of the Prussian 
Academy of Arts in Berlin, but was rejected, allegedly because he was «too 
intelligent to be a true creative writer»1. Despite this ambivalent slur and 
despite Musil’s contempt for anti-intellectualism and what he called 
«wishy-washy mysticism», he was, in fact, a rather curious champion of 
types of thinking often maligned as stupid. Trained as an engineer, a phi-
losopher, a behavioral psychologist and a mathematician, he abandoned all 
of these professions in order to become a creative writer (a Dichter) and 
even admits to having taken up the study of logic and mathematics «in or-
der to conquer them»2. Nevertheless, many Musil scholars, attached to his 
                                                     
1 Klaus Amann, «Literature and Politics» in A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil 
(Camden House, 2009), 65. 
2 Musil writes that he was «von einer tiefen Verachtung für den Verstand erfüllt» 
(filled with a deep contempt for reason). «Zur gleichen Zeit» (At the same time), he con-
tinues, he began to throw himself into his fresh enthusiasm for logical and mathematical 
studies, in order, he explains, «um sie zu besiegen» (to conquer them). Klagenfurter Ausgabe 
(Klagenfurt Edition): Annotated Digital Edition of the Collected Works, Letters and Lit-
erary and Biographical Remains, with Transcriptions and Facsimiles of All Manuscripts. 
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hyper-intellectuality, persist in calling him a «scientific rationalist» and in 
arguing that he ultimately rejected what by their standards are unintelli-
gent, i.e., aesthetic and mystical solutions to the problems posed in his 
great, unfinished novel, The Man Without Qualities. Yet, these problems, in-
cluding such unanswerable questions as «how to live the right life», «how 
do we hold a feeling fast», and «what is reality», are precisely of the sort 
which necessitate a humble admittance of incapacity, of, even, a sort of 
stupidity in the face of an infinite questioning about what it might mean to 
be human. They are questions which can only be explored by means of di-
smantling mono-logics and certainties and by creating a new, living, poly-
logos, by facilitating a new sort of seeing. And to see new is, almost by de-
finition, to see in a way that looks stupid to those who are entrenched in 
some old surety. There may not be words or syntax yet to describe what is 
new, but one certainly can’t use the old ones in the old way; thus the new 
seer is caught in a moment of stuttering and stammering, circling and 
speaking in tongues. The new seer may find his or her project endlessly 
complex, unfinishable, like Musil’s expanding novel, while another will 
have finished, efficiently and smoothly, in no time at all. 
The other morning I was on my way to discuss with some intellectual 
lady friends whether or not logic is a male construct we might better dis-
pense with. I told this to two of my male friends on my way out the door. 
«What», exclaimed one of them, «you had better not try using logic to de-
bunk it!». I tried to explain the much-discussed difficulty of using a male-
made language to talk about modes of being potentially external to it, 
when the other friend picked up a knife in the dish rack and said, «We 
men call this a knife. What do you women call it?» The word logic, of 
course, comes from the word logos, therefore language and logic are 
thought to be inextricably related. What is a knife? It is a stabber and a 
spreader. A pricker and a slicer, a threat and a promise, a tool and a cold 
metal caress. 
When examined in light of contemporary feminist poetics, the impulse 
to answer the question of definition with multiple personal associations 
rather than one simple word is reminiscent of Luce Irigaray ’s notion of a 
«sex that is not one». Multiple answers speak the language of multiple 
erogenous zones in contrast to the mono-directional thrust of the male 
logos. What does this imply about logic? In attempting to answer my 
friend’s question, I thought about the idea of multiplying instead of re-
                                                     
Ed. Walter Fanta, Klaus Amann, and Karl Corino. Robert Musil-Institut, Alpen-Adria 
Universita ̈t Klagenfurt, Austria, 2009: Ulrichs Tagebuch. Die Utopie der Höflichkeit. 
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ducing, of infinite proliferation, of dialogics and poly-logics, and, of 
course, I thought of Musil’s sketch «What is a Street». In this sketch Musil 
mocks the 2x2=4 people whom, were you to ask them, «What is a street?» 
would be annoyed by the stupidity of the question and answer: «a street? 
A street is a street. Period.» The other kind of person, the seer or vision-
ary, Musil calls him, «knows most certainly that a street is not something 
straight and day-bright, but rather that it can just as well be ... something 
with multiple branches, filled with secrets and riddles, with traps and un-
derground passageways, hidden prisons and buried churches,»3 a means to 
become lost or to really find one’s complex self – or even to find another 
human being in a new world. 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche, another thinker with an ambivalent rela-
tionship to rationality, argues that polytheism was important because it 
helped people to see with individual and varied eyes, and taught them how 
to see a «plurality of norms» instead of being mono-centered. This variety, 
although nominally about «gods, heroes, and overmen of all kinds, as well 
as near- men and undermen, dwarfs, fairies, centaurs, satyrs, demons, and 
devils», came to be a structural model of seeing individually and of estab-
lishing the rights of the individual, «free-spiriting» and «many-spiriting». 
Polytheism became a prototype for the individual’s «strength to create for 
ourselves our own new eyes – and ever again new eyes that are even more 
our own; hence man alone among all the animals has no eternal horizons 
and perspectives. »4 We create limits and horizons ourselves, defining and 
ordering regenerative chaos. While this is understandable and probably 
necessary, Nietzsche, in his posthumous essay «On Truth and Lying in a 
Supra-Moral Sense», reminds us of our role as «creative subjects» in the 
constant proliferation of these constructions and encourages us to make 
ever new and more varied metaphors to describe and arrange what is es-
sentially a fluid and ungraspable reality5. 
The many new eyes that are eternally created and recreated by such a 
process are also present in Rilke’s «Archaic Torso of Apollo», where the 
headless sculpture shines like a candelabra of individual candles: «For» as 
                                                     
3 Robert Musil: Tagebücher [Diaries]. Ed. Adolf Frisé. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 
1976, 9. 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, 
trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 191-92. 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, «On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense» in The Norton An-
thology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch, trans. Ronald Speirs (New York: Nor-
ton, 2001), 874-884, 
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Rilke writes, «there is no place that does not see you»6. The many points 
of de-centered seeing tell the viewer, the reader, the poet, «You must 
change your life», circling us around to the connection between the for-
mal/aesthetic and the ethical/worldly. A body that sees ― breaking out of 
all bounds like a star with many points ― is a body made entirely of eyes – 
multiple points of vision without one center. A novel, too, can have mul-
tiple centers. 
Being without center, however, does not mean being without meaning, 
or without ethics. On the contrary, this multiplicity of shifting, changing 
perspectives requires an even greater attention than that «wretched con-
tentment» Nietzsche diagnosed in his contemporaries. Success, as Walter 
Pater described it, is the «failure to form habits. » And art, like the con-
sciousness of the reality of death, is a means to wake people up, «vivi-
fizieren, dephlegmatisieren» as Novalis describes the purpose of philoso-
phy7. Abstraction, Musil writes in his essay Toward a New Aesthetic, ex-
plodes «the normal totality of experience» and this explosion, he main-
tains, is «the basic capacity of every form of art»8. Art, he writes, «is a “dis-
turbance” in which elements of reality are reconstituted as an unreal whole 
that usurps the value of reality»9. In his search for the best way to live, 
Musil sought a «motivated life» through engagement with what he called 
the living word and a constant revivification of relative aesthetic and ethical 
vision. 
The constant destabilization is accompanied by an opening to possi-
bilities, and the articulation of new creation, but to see new is initially to 
see like a child, an innocent, or a fool. It is to stutter, stammer, stumble. It 
is a necessarily inefficient process, and Musil, who turned over every idea 
in his mind in painstakingly thorough relation to every other idea, con-
stantly testing its relative and current validity, was speaking of himself 
when he titled an important unpublished essay, «Ruminations of a slow-
witted man»10. And he may have been thinking of what he referred to in 
one note as the «sympathetic role that idiots play in art» when, in a very 
early version of his novel concept, he named his protagonist Hans Narr, a 
                                                     
6 Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Gedichte, 483, translation mine. 
7 Walter Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry (Berkeley & LA: U of California 
P, 1980), 188. 
8 Robert Musil, Precision and Soul: Essays and Addresses. Ed. and trans. Burton Pike and 
David S. Luft. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1990, 200. 
9 Musil, Precision, 196. 
10 Musil, Precision, 214-236. 
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German version of the archetypal Foolish Hans or Jack the Knave11. Be-
fore he arrived at the name of Ulrich for this character who would be his 
«friend», his alter ego, he tried a variety of names, including Anders, which 
means «other». The relationship between foolishness, otherness, and the 
marginal role of the artist and intellectual is highlighted by this palimpsest 
of names, just as it is by Musil’s laboratory of a thousand manuscripts, 
their obsessive and deferring re-visioning, their infinite proliferation of 
metaphors, analogies, possibilities. Like other Modernist novelists, Musil’s 
goal was to enable fresh-seeing by opening up a narrative field of perspec-
tival circularity, dwelling in momentary presence rather than pushing to-
ward linear progress, worldly success, or conformity to preconceived con-
cepts. This fresh seeing aimed to create an existential awareness of the in-
dividual’s role in the continual co-creation of realities through poly-logical 
imagining. 
Modernist re-visioning was an aesthetic-ethical imperative of great 
moment in an era where the myth of historical progress came to be paired 
with treacherously totalitarian Gleichschaltung, a new word coined by the 
Nazi regime to connote the enforcement of a policy of totalizing confor-
mity of ideas, attitudes and action12. The resistance to the coming of 
                                                     
11 KA: Lesetexte. Band 4, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. Die Vorstufen. Aus dem 
Nachlass Ediertes. Vorarbeit zum Roman. Haus ohne Gegenüber: «II. Fassung: Der zum 
Bewußtsein der Eigenart seiner Kraft gekommene Hans Narr. Der zur Feinheit des 
Geistes gekommene Hans Narr. Er sucht seine Schwester auf – die verlobte, spät ver-
lobte – und überzeugt sie». 
12 Two aphorisms by Musil defining this Nazi neologism: «Gleichschaltung. Another 
measure of the strangeness of what is happening today with the German spirit is that a 
word has come into usage for a large part of these happenings which presents the native 
speaker with no less difficulty than it does a foreigner. «Schalten», the action word at its 
foundation, belongs to the older history of the German language and had possessed in 
the present day only a weakened life, so that there were indeed many derivations of it in 
use, while it itself was somewhat petrified and only used in specific situations. So one can 
say, for example, that someone schaltet free (disconnects or isolates) from something, 
but the simple sentence one schaltet no longer carries a complete meaning. On the 
whole, the word is most often seen in the formula «schalten und walten», which means 
something to the effect of to manage and to have a free hand, but which is spun with a 
bit of poetical moss. One grasps that there is some Romanticism behind the idea of using 
the word schalten. Its original meaning signifies to push, tow, set in motion, force. This 
Romantic word has the most modern of children. A Schalter is something at the train 
station, namely a ticket office, and something having to do with electrical room lighting 
signifies a little window that one can push open and closed, but also there is, in an elec-
tric power station, something called a large «Schalt-board» [...]» – «Gleichschaltung: 1) 
The word It marks the strangeness (it will be difficult for foreigners to understand it) of 
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Gleichschaltung is embodied in Musil’s novel by the alternate consciousness 
state he calls the Other Condition. This Other Condition is an extra-tem-
poral aesthetic mystical experience, which functions as an interruption to 
the rule of what in the title to the first book of Musil’s novel is called 
«seinesgleichen geschieht», or the self-same prevails. In Book II, «The 
Criminals: Into the Millennium», it is this extra-temporal condition of 
otherness, as ethical-aesthetic quickening, that prevails as the most prom-
ising utopian configuration of a-social deviation from sameness marked by 
its title. Alterity, in other words, is tantamount to crime; and crime is a 
necessary stage in the process of new seeing, which itself is often seen as a 
form of crime. 
In his controversial 1937 talk, «On Stupidity», Musil presents stupidity 
(die Dummheit, a feminine noun in German) as a female artist, a Künstlerin, 
who, instead of answering with one simple word, responds in multiple as-
sociations when she plays the association-word game. For example, when 
prompted with the word «prison», she will answer, «consists of cells where 
one locks up useless people»; when prompted with the word «sick», she 
responds with a personal experience: «I was sick once». When prompted 
with «father», she tells a tale of brutality: «he threw me down the stairs 
once»13. Stupidity, this woman artist, talks too much about herself, is un-
seemly and improper, and doesn’t seem to think or express herself in a 
linear manner. Musil had argued in his 1929 essay, Woman, Yesterday and 
Tomorrow that «Woman is tired of being the ideal of the man who no 
                                                     
what is happening today in Germany, that this word Gleichschaltung, which plays such a 
large role in it, cannot be directly translated into other languages. This word was suddenly 
there one day out of nowhere for the not-yet-National Socialist Germans. Lamps, ma-
chines are gleichgeschaltet (switched into conformity) – and Germans. Difference be-
tween norms and similarities. It has active and passive meanings in psychiatry. Levers and 
similar mechanisms, electric currents ein- und ausschalten (switching on and off). Schalt-
werk (control unit). Schalthebel (switching lever) In general: Gleichstrom (co- or parallel 
current): a current whose direction remains the same. There is a Batterieschaltung (accu-
mulator switch) for galvanic elements, next to and following one another. One speaks of 
(different) modes of Schaltung in dynamo machines. Likewise in an electrical lighting sys-
tem. Schalten, middle high German. To push, tow (esp. a ship), into movement, to force. 
In new high German becomes = to steer; old high German scaltan = to push, new high 
German. Schalter = sliding sash from middle high German schalter (schelter) = bolt. 
Schaltjahr (leap year) already in old high German because of the day that is pushed for-
ward. (to push is also a basic meaning of schalten) [Walten really = being strong] see 
Gewalt (violence) [...]». KA: Lesetexte Band 14. Gedichte, Aphorismen, Selbstkommen-
tar. Aphorismen aus dem Nachlass. Ich stelle zusammen. Trans. mine. 
13 Musil, Precision, 282-283. 
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longer has sufficient energy to idealize, and [that] she has taken over the 
task of thinking herself through as her own ideal image». In 1929 he had 
written that women, who were intent on becoming the actors of them-
selves, had contributed to «a great purification of the atmosphere», con-
cluding with approbation that the new woman, «no longer wants to be an 
ideal at all but to create ideals, to contribute to their formation just as men 
do»14. Had he changed his mind in less than a decade? 
Avital Ronell, in her book Stupidity, registers nausea in response to what 
she sees as a lapse into misogyny in this 1937 address, suggesting that 
Musil evades the real bully of totalitarianism whom he cannot directly at-
tack by picking on someone weaker15. But let us look at this a bit more 
closely. Musil’s On Stupidity is a very strange address, filled with a more 
than usual amount of ambivalence and an even less than usual amount of 
closure for Musil. He rarely connects the different strands of ideas, rarely 
shows us directly how one section seems to contradict the other, how the 
different types of stupidity are hopelessly mixed up on the hierarchy of 
good, bad, dangerous, higher, lower, peaceful, violent, brutal, passive, vic-
timized, sadistic, holy. The address asks a good deal of the listener. It 
seems, often, to not make sense. Is it in code? Could he have spoken di-
rectly at that time if he had wanted to? About an address he presented in 
1934 in Vienna he noted that its success consisted in the fact that he had 
dared, at all, to speak16. 
Both Ronell and Musil agree that premature closure is a prime charac-
teristic of the bad sort of stupidity. Coming too quickly to closure, think-
ing that one has complete mastery over something or someone, believing 
one has understood everything are signs of stupidity. Thus, if we are not 
to jump too quickly to conclusions, we may register our discomfort (nau-
sea even) at Musil’s association, but should stay to explore what is incom-
pletely in the air here. The association of the woman artist and stupidity is 
probably not, as Ronell points out, merely grammatically determined by 
their shared noun gender; there is more to it, conscious or not; although 
not, in my reading, misogyny. It might seem even more damning that the 
woman artist in the finished talk is originally an «imbecile» or an «idiot» in 
                                                     
14 Musil, Precision, 213. 
15 Avital Ronell, Stupidity, University of Illinois Press, 2002, 67. 
16 Musil noted that the greatest success of this speech was that he had spoken at all 
(«der Erfolg dieses meines Vortrags hat hauptsächlich darin bestanden, daß ich über-
haupt gesprochen habe»). KA: Lesetexte. Band 9 Reden. Vortragsmanuskripte aus dem 
Nachlass. Der Dichter in dieser Zeit. Einleitung Basel. 
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the notes, until we read Musil’s admission: «the idiot who answers like I 
do»17. Musil, as becomes clear when one examines the preparatory notes 
for his talk, is actually identifying himself, and the artist and intellectual in 
general, with this maligned and threatened woman artist, «die Dummheit», 
who knows that it is sometimes wise to hide one’s intelligence from the 
brutes who are more powerful. While some men may blame her for this 
subterfuge, Musil notes, «a realistic observer will recognize it as a weapon 
which encircles her». Further, the imperative outlined in his 1929 essay 
that the human body, woman’s body in particular, free itself from the ideals 
imposed upon it from outside, in order to become «the actor of itself», is 
an apt image for Musil’s radical rejection of the total rule of a priori forms, 
externally imposed ideals, communal language and values. The Modernist 
artist, like the new woman, wants to create her own ideals and come to his 
own conclusions about reality, wants, in sum, to participate in the ongoing 
creation of the world through discourse. 
While in the talk he makes the fleeting connection between the imbe-
cile/woman artist’s answers and the poetic, in his notes for the address, he 
expands on this, remarking that the imbeciles’ answers have a great plas-
ticity, a corporality «... they do not answer conceptually, but tell a story, 
dramatic or epic ...». They narrate superfluities and contexts that «are con-
nected to the theme through an underground sea»18. The stupid woman 
artist who answers in complexly personal associations in the address is a 
twin to Musil himself, a person who sees the undersea or underground 
connections between ideas and things, sees knives and streets and fathers 
and stupidities as multi-faceted impressionistic shape-shifters, different in 
different circumstances; and anyone who would censure her is a 2x2 = 4 
person, hopelessly obtuse. In this context, the imbeciles, the women art-
ists, the idiot poets who, Musil writes in his notes for the address, speak 
like «painterly primitives» when responding to associative prompts, are 
stand-ins for Modernist artists, maligned by National Socialist theory as 
«entartet» (degenerate). Yet, Modernist artists themselves (Musil included) 
often happily admitted of some affinity with the art of the insane, of chil-
dren, and of «primitive» cultures, precisely because this work provided 
access to the «spherical»19 realms of the subconscious and sub-logical. 
                                                     
17 KA: Transkriptionen und Faksimiles: Nachlassmappen. Nachlass Gruppe III. 
Mappe III/4. «Über die Dummheit». III/4/97. Schm Entwurf 7. Trans. mine. 
18 KA: Transkriptionen und Faksimiles: Nachlassmappen. Nachlass Gruppe III. 
Mappe III/4. «Über die Dummheit». III/4/97. Schm Entwurf 7. Trans. mine. 
19 Musil learned this word from Ernst Kretschmer and discussed its meanings in a 
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Despite its tendency to utilize the emotional capacity of collectivist hys-
teria for its own purposes, the reign of linear mono-logic, meanwhile, was 
sadistically intent on eliminating even the quietest individual voice of dis-
sent or alternative vision. 
The political nature of Musil’s address is much clearer in the prelimi-
nary notes, where he was able to be braver, revealing that he felt himself 
as artist and human directly endangered and maligned by the invectives of 
the totalitarian regimes in power. In one instance he notes the danger to 
which one who questions the prevailing valuations of stupidity exposes 
himself. He could be accused of having a «destructive attitude during the 
contemporary historical development» which he calls «the ether swoon». 
«Yes», he continues, «it is not impossible that there would be hotheads 
who would accuse him of a lack of a patriotic or völkish attitude». Musil 
finishes ironically: «Of that lack he knows himself to be exonerated. And I 
hope that no one would fear that this will become a polit[ical] exposition. 
I am only speaking about stupidity»20. Later Musil comments about the 
German «herd instinct» which had already existed before it found its cur-
rent political form, and a slight bit later on the relevance of a discussion of 
sadism, «because our time has developed a social sadism» related directly 
                                                     
number of diary entries: See Tagebücher, 838: «6. April 1930. Frühling – Brüder Čapek – 
Prag – diese drei Worte verbunden durch ein ziemlich unsinniges Zeitwort bildeten 
meinen Bewußtseinsinhalt beim Aufwachen nachmittags. Ich hatte die ganze Zeit über 
geglaubt, nicht zu schlafen, sondern wach zu denken. Es wäre eine Art gestörtes Denken, 
das mit der Freudschen Traumtheorie nichts zu tun hat. Aber etwas später kam mir doch 
vor, ich hätte ein ähnliches Bild vor mir gehabt, wie eins einmal in der Prager Presse war, 
einer der Čapeks ein Blumenbeet gießend. Das wäre dann wohl ein Bilddenken, 
“sphärisch” in Worte übersetzt». [6. April 1930. Spring – Capek brothers – Prague – 
these three words bound together by a seemingly meaningless verb constituted the con-
tent of my consciousness upon awaking in the afternoon. The whole time I had thought 
that I had not been sleeping, but rather had been thinking while awake. It would have 
been a kind of disordered thought quite different from Freud’s theory of dreams. But lat-
er it occurred to me that I had had seen a picture before me, similar to one I had seen 
once in the Prager Presse, of one of the Čapeks watering a bed of flowers. That would be 
rather a thinking in pictures, «spherically» translated into words] And: «Nur habe ich das 
früher durch eine Art Anklingen (assoziativ oder “sphärisch”) zu erklären versucht. Es ist 
aber wohl so, wie beim Schreiben selbst: wenn aus einer Leitidee Gedanken hervorgehn, 
die man unmöglich wissen konnte» (Tagebücher, 862). [ But in the past I have attempted to 
explain this as a kind of suggestion (associative or «spherical»). It is, however, the same 
with writing itself: when ideas arise from out of a main theme that one could not have 
anticipated.] Trans. mine. 
20 KA: Transkriptionen und Faksimiles: Nachlassmappen. Nachlass Gruppe III. 
Mappe III/4. «Über die Dummheit». III/4/113. A 1 1. Trans. mine. 
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to «humanism’s lack of resistance»21. While humanism does not know how 
to defend itself, society, Musil laments at the start of the address, is guilty 
of its own resistance, a resistance to art which he calls a special kind of 
«art stupidity». The word stupid, he notes further, had often been used to 
refer to poetry in more intellectually happy and liberal times; but now it 
has been replaced in part by «political and national invective» and an un-
conscionably excessive brutality and passionate intensity aimed at anyone 
who would dare to see differently. Music that is «übermodern» (overly 
modern), Musil notes, is called «undeutsch» (un-German), really just an-
other word for stupid22. The idiot is the other, par excellence. 
The intellectual and the Jew, writes Musil elsewhere, as if he were talk-
ing about the type of the man without qualities, are both extraterritorial, 
stateless beings. They cannot, in other words, be successfully integrated 
into the Gleichschaltung. The stranger, adds Georg Simmel, referring to the 
role of the Jew in contemporary German society, «is not radically com-
mitted to the unique ingredients and peculiar tendencies of the group, and 
therefore approaches them with the specific attitude of “objectivity”. But 
objectivity does not simply involve passivity and detachment; it is a par-
ticular structure composed of distance and nearness, indifference and in-
volvement». The stranger’s «dangerous possibilities», Simmel suggests, 
proceed from the fact that «he is not tied down in his action by habit, pi-
ety, and precedent»23. This openness is reminiscent of Iragaray’s impulse 
to liberate the subject from a pre-configured logos in The Way of Love. 
Outside of the safety of what she calls its «language-house», «the subject 
accepts being unsheltered. A stranger in his own land, he turns back to a 
more radical disappropriation, where keeping the senses awake is indis-
pensable for survival ... here the eyes have another function than recog-
nizing the same, the identical ... They open anew upon the unknown ... 
they discover again astonishment, contemplation, admiration, restored to 
the ingenuousness of the child. They see anew, not blinded by what they 
have to see in accordance with speech»24. Such seeing requires a resistance 
to settled sureties and to what Musil would call dead words. To utilize liv-
ing words, on the other hand, is a form of Keats’ «negative capability». 
                                                     
21 KA: Transkriptionen und Faksimiles: Nachlassmappen. Nachlass Gruppe III. 
Mappe III/4. «Über die Dummheit». III/4/115 A 1 3. Trans. mine. 
22 KA: Transkriptionen und Faksimiles: Nachlassmappen. Nachlass Gruppe III. 
Mappe III/4. «Über die Dummheit». III/4/5 H 5. Trans. mine. 
23 Georg Simmel. The Sociology of Georg Simmel, NY: The Free Press, 1950, 404. 
24 Luce Iragaray. The Way of Love. Continuum, 2004, 45. 
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Shakespeare, as Keats wrote was «capable of being in uncertainties, mys-
teries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason»25. This 
resistance to premature closure and polarized posturing is an aesthetic 
practice of flexible ethical aliveness in the face of stale and outmoded re-
ceived ideas, absolutes, and finalities. 
In conscious distinction to the parole of «final solutions», Musil chose 
to approach provisional answers to unanswerable questions and, further-
more, to do this in the language of literature. He chose to write a novel in-
stead of a work of philosophy precisely to avail himself of the formal lan-
guages of subconscious imagery and infinitely associative metaphor, varia-
tion and repetition, deferral and suspension of time and narrative, realms 
he knew from his extensive studies of psychology, anthropology and reli-
gious experience to be dangerously close to the pre-logical, primitive, mys-
tical or insane. Musil considered the exceptional and fleeting con-
sciousness of the aesthetic Other Condition to be the foundation of ethics 
and of a motivated conduct of life. To act according to ethics or ideals, 
alas, is considered foolish and adolescent, feminine, idealistic, unrealistic, 
if not anti-social or threatening, even today. But society, the state or na-
tion, as Musil repeats again and again in the aphorisms and sketches from 
the period of Gleichschaltung, is in dire need of the autonomous voice of the 
marginalized Geist, an untranslatable but key word that signifies a combi-
nation of spirit, intellect, feeling and culture. Indeed, the synthesis of what 
Musil called «precision and soul» embodied in the word Geist strikes at the 
heart of what he diagnosed as a deeply problematic polarization of 
thought and feeling. While many Musil scholars still believe that he in-
tended to reject the aesthetic mystical Other Condition as possible solu-
tion to the problems posed in the novel, I maintain that it remained cen-
tral to Musil’s conduct of life, his narrative aims, and aesthetic-ethical ac-
tivity. But this is not to say that Musil did not care about reality. 
Aesthetic experimentation, far from being disinterested, is intrinsically 
related to political and social liberation, to social ethics, as is the experi-
mental novel, perhaps precisely because, as Bakhtin noted, it is inherently 
anti-canonical. «The novel», writes Michael Holquist in his introduction to 
The Dialogic Imagination, «is the name Bakhtin gives to whatever force is at 
work within a given literary system to reveal the limits, the artificial con-
                                                     
25 John Keats, qtd. In Albert Elmer Hancock. John Keats: A Literary Biography. Boston 
& NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1908, 121-122. 
92 
 
Genese Grill  
   
_________________________________________________________ 
Studia austriaca XXI (2013) 
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 
straints of that system»26. Allen Thiher, in his Understanding Robert Musil27, 
puts the case even more directly, when he says that both Musil and Bak-
htin «wrote to defend freedom against stultifying dogma and illiberal to-
talitarianism» (137). Thiher writes that he knows of «no other thinker ... 
who stressed with such lucidity that ethical thinking and art are interre-
lated». Thiher connects this resistance to Musil’s «theory of the destruc-
tion of forms», invoking the Kabbalistic mystical imperative to continually 
repair the original vessels of creation which are said to have burst because 
they could not «contain the light emanating from God’s being». Thiher 
reminds us that although «the vessels must be continually broken so that 
the light may be propagated [...] there must also be vessels so that it can be 
contained. The destruction of the forms of perceived thought and per-
ception is a necessary process, which gives access to a new condition be-
yond received ideas and their rationality». After the destruction, in other 
words, there must be new creation, new forms. 
Bakhtinian heteroglossia and polyphony are terms of generative delight 
as they dare to revel in the infinity of creative possibilities in the face of 
death camps and the silencing firing squad. I think here of the experience 
of Bakhtin’s great countryman Dostoevsky, who may have learned how to 
speak in tongues and how to celebrate the idiot from his dramatic reprieve 
from execution. Prince Myshkin, Doestoevsky’s idiot hero, has learned to 
see while away in Switzerland, as a result of his epileptic attacks, which 
have the effect of making everything look «strange». His attacks are pre-
ceded by moments of an Other Condition of ecstasy so powerful that, 
Dostoevsky writes, «all these gleams and flashes of the highest sensation 
of life and self-consciousness, and therefore also of the highest form of 
existence» seemed to him «the acme of harmony and beauty”28. Despite 
his association of these moments with disease and idiocy, he declares that 
«For this moment one might give one’s whole life». These «higher mo-
ments» contain «infinite happiness», he concludes, making the connection 
between these small units of interruption to the normal flow of time and 
infinity or timelessness: «At that moment», says Myshkin, «I seem some-
how to understand the extraordinary saying that there shall be no more time»29. 
                                                     
26 Michael Holquist. «Introduction». The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, Austin: U of 
Texas Press, 1981, xxxi. 
27 Allen Thiher. Understanding Robert Musil, Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 2009, 201. 
28 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Idiot, trans. Constance Garnett. New York: Macmillan, 
1923, 224. 
29 Dostoevsky, The Idiot, 225. 
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Musil, who had one of his first mystical experiences during the First 
World War when he was almost killed by an aerial dart, understood Dos-
toevsky’s connection between an ethical imperative of Heideggerian «be-
ing towards death», extra-temporal aesthetic experience and the wake-
fulness of seeing new. Musil’s quest in the novel to make a heightened 
feeling last is foreshadowed by Prince Myshkin’s story of a condemned 
man who expressed dismay that he had not lived every moment as an 
eternity while alive. Myshkin admits that even when the man is miracu-
lously set free he probably didn’t «live each moment as an eternity and not 
waste one» ... that in truth, «he wasted many»30. But he still insists that, de-
spite its seeming impossibility, he believes it could and should be at-
tempted. Musil too, although admitting that it is impossible to keep a feel-
ing fresh or to maintain the ecstasy of the Other Condition indefinitely, 
celebrates the value of the flame that is recurrently ignited there and its in-
stigation toward what he calls in one note, «a deepening of personality» 
and «something fine everyday»31. Whether it is impossible or not to live 
every moment as an eternity and not waste one, to do so would certainly 
be deemed idiotic in a society which avoids the reality of death at all costs. 
Yet, since death in fact is the most objective thing there is (there is not 
one of us who is not condemned to die), to ignore it seems the greatest of 
delusions and fictions! Maybe this is why art, created by that great trans-
formation artist, Stupidity herself, is always reminding us of death, if only 
by its quickening to life. 
What is seen as stupid, Musil explains, depends on the context. As the 
fool-hardy but righteous Antigone said to her more reasonable sister Is-
mene, «One world approved my wisdom; another thine»32. What is stupid 
may be heroic, but, as Musil notes, society generally favors seemliness and 
successful enterprises over rashness and excess. Antigone, after all, is 
killed at the end, and she gave up her life for a mere ideal, a spiritual mat-
ter. Sophie Scholl, the young German resistance fighter who with her 
brother distributed fliers condemning the National Socialist regime at their 
university, was «stupid» enough to cast the fliers down into the entrance 
way of the university after she and her brother had succeeded in avoiding 
detection. But was it not deemed stupid enough by most people for her to 
have dared to distribute the fliers, to have dared to resist in the first place? 
                                                     
30 Dosteovesky, The Idiot, 51. 
31 KA: Kommentar & Apparate. Register. Autoren und Werke. K: Key, Ellen. 
32 Sophocles. The Plays and Fragments. Trans. & ed. by Richard Jebb. Cambridge: The 
University Press, 1900, 107. 
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The unnecessary gesture, in any case, her arm casting the fliers like living 
birds onto the heads of her terrified and silenced co-patriots, this beautiful, 
irrational, unexplainable gesture of freedom, cost both siblings their heads. 
But she had already lost hers. 
Because stupidity, though hard to define, seems mainly to be associated 
with being impractical, incapable, inefficient, useless, something like po-
etry, perhaps, or love, or dreaming, or an overly idealistic insistence on 
values or self-expression. But to be too reasonable or too capable, notes 
Musil, is stupid too, and somewhat inhuman, lacking the proper degree of 
emotional connectivity. He may have been thinking of his own notorious 
coldness. We know that he struggled with how brave he was or was not 
willing to be in his vocal criticism of the totalitarian regimes of Germany 
and Austria, and, we know, as he put it in his Ruminations of a Slow-witted 
Mind: how much the «challenge and duty to speak. To exercise criticism»33 
weighed upon him. He may have wished he could have been stupider, but 
he had his Jewish wife’s life, as well as his own, to consider. 
Perhaps it takes a man who was considered too intelligent to be a crea-
tive writer to say it with impunity, but while we work to articulate the 
complexity of this world that is not one, we would do well to wonder at 
the strange topsy-turvydom which declares the stuttering, stammering 
seers of new worlds, the pioneering founders of new languages and cus-
toms, the unseemly actors of themselves the stupid ones, when compared 
to those who think they already know or who rest comfortably upon the 
laurels of an already-constructed and controlling system of pre-judgment 
and assumptions. It is quite a brave, or rather a fool-hardy task to hearken 
to a presentiment of an «other» way of seeing and to try, amid all the hazi-
ness of the vision and in opposition to the clarity and dominance of the 
status quo, to articulate what it looks like, what it might bring us, how it 
might be integrated into what we already have and already know. Call it 
stupid if you can’t find a better word for it, inefficient, chaotic, primitive, 
idealistic, incomplete, digressive, non-linear, mysticism, utopia, feminine, 
irrational, aesthetic, un-German, useless, or any number of insulting 
words. But it probably takes a good deal more intelligence to listen for the 
complex and infinite strains of a polyphonic living logos than it does to rec-
ognize the same old mono-syllabic one-note knife. 
                                                     
33 Musil. Precision, 227. 
